believe that "gaydar is real" relied more heavily on stereotypes to categorize men as gay. People who were told that gaydar is merely another term for stereotyping, however, stereotyped at much lower rates, even though they were neither discouraged from stereotyping nor told that the stereotypes were inaccurate. These results directly demonstrate that the folk notion of gaydar serves the function of a legitimizing myth: Rhetoric that authenticates gaydar increases stereotyping, but identifying gaydar as stereotyping decreases reliance on stereotypes.
The people who rely most on stereotype-based gaydar are also more motivated to express prejudice (Forscher, Cox, Graetz, & Devine, 2015) , and using stereotypes to privately make a snap judgment that someone is gay grants "plausible deniability" to express anti-gay aggression (Cox & Devine, 2014) . In an aggression study using real electric shocks, a key subset of people took advantage of this plausible deniability as a smokescreen for their anti-gay prejudice, administering high levels of electric shocks to a man who was stereotypically implied to be gay (Cox & Devine, 2014) . Although the cultural notion of gaydar may seem lighthearted, evidence indicates that the stereotyping processes camouflaged under the guise of gaydar can have pernicious effects.
Inaccuracy of Gaydar
Whether or not stereotyping relates to other adverse consequences, it is possible for stereotypes to yield accurate snap judgments. In fact, as reviewed extensively by Rule and colleagues (2016) in reply to our recent article (Cox et al., 2016) , several researchers claim that people's snap judgments about sexual orientation are largely accurate (e.g., Gaudio, 1994; Johnson, Gill, Reichman, & Tassinary, 2007; Rieger, Linsenmeier, Gygax, Garcia, & Bailey, 2010; Rule, Ambady, Adams, & Macrae, 2008) . We argued that the conclusions of this past work were misleading and incorrect, based on (a) a methodological confound we serendipitously uncovered and (b) a fundamental flaw in the reasoning and design of the past work. As we review next, Rule, Johnson, and Freeman's (2016) reply falls short of addressing either of these issues.
Internal Validity Problems in Past Face-Based Gaydar Research
As reported in Cox et al. (2016) , we found a quality confound in two stimulus sets collected in an attempt to replicate and extend some of Rule et al.'s (2008) work on perceiving orientation from the face (i.e., "face-based gaydar"). We discovered a natural confound, such that gay men's and lesbian women's pictures were of higher quality than those of their straight counterparts. When we controlled for quality statistically or matched the stimuli on quality, the "gaydar" effects found in previous work disappeared. Rule et al. (2016) did not present any data or arguments that disputed or tried to explain this nonreplication. In response to the possibility that their stimulus sets may contain the same quality confound, they collected data on the quality of their stimuli, finding that quality confounds existed in only five of their 13 stimulus sets. Several of the confounds in their stimulus sets were in the opposite direction of the confound we discovered, which they erroneously offered as evidence against our claims. Rule and colleagues (2016) seem to misunderstand our original article. The quality confounds, in our stimuli and in theirs, are a serious threat to internal validity, not a pattern that we theoretically predicted in a particular direction. Any experiment with built-in confounds is inherently undermined by those confounds, no matter their direction. With our two stimulus sets and Rule and colleagues' (2008) 13 sets, in total 47% of the stimulus sets contained quality confounds, which does not inspire confidence about the internal validity of this area of work.
Quality is but one confound that may exist among stimulus sets. Because Rule and colleagues (2008) do not share their stimuli with outside research teams, other scientists cannot evaluate any other dimensions on which their stimuli may differ. Nevertheless, even if further studies can address these internal validity threats and replicate past patterns of "accurate" orientation perception, doing so will not address the more fundamental flaw inherent in the reasoning underlying this area of work. Rule et al. (2016) repeatedly state that our article ignored large swaths of evidence demonstrating the accuracy of gaydar. This claim, however, is incorrect. Although we did not specifically cite and review every paper they mentioned, we concretely identified a mathematical and logical error that is shared by all past gaydar research (see Cox et al., 2016, pp. 167-168; see also Plöderl, 2014) . In so doing, we directly demonstrated that the patterns heralded as evidence of accurate gaydar in fact provide direct evidence that gaydar is highly inaccurate.
Evidence of Accuracy in the Lab Provides Evidence of Inaccuracy in the Real World
Gaydar studies largely follow the same basic formula, as follows: Participants are asked to make gay-or-straight judgments based on stimuli (e.g., pictures, video, sound clips) gathered from gay men and straight men. 1 Half of the stimuli come from straight men and half come from gay men, and accuracy is assessed relative to 50% chance, which is the accuracy rate one would get if participants were purely guessing. In this work, people typically have 55% to 65% accuracy, which is significantly higher than 50% chance. Based on this evidence, then, do people have accurate gaydar? At first glance, the answer seems to be yes; people are correct more than they are incorrect. Further thought, however, reveals that this conclusion is erroneous.
The fundamental error in this work is its reliance on artificial base rates, in which 50% of the targets are gay. In the real world, the best estimates we have say that, at most, 5% of men identify as gay (Savin-Williams, 2006) . This consideration of ecological validity drastically changes the interpretation of the 60% accuracy rate. 2 Figure 1 shows what a 60% accuracy rate looks like when translated to the real world, where only 5% of men are gay. An accuracy rate of 60% means that 40% of straight men are miscategorized as gay, and this 40% far outnumbers the 5% of men who are actually gay. Once real-world base rates of gay men are considered, all available evidence from past work indicates that when perceivers "use their gaydar" to conclude that someone is gay, they will be wrong 93% of the time. Overall accuracy of 60% translates to 7% accuracy for identifying who is gay. This statistic is readily derived from the data of all past gaydar studies, and it provides a very clear answer: There is no pragmatic accuracy to gaydar.
Next Steps: Saving the Baby From the Bathwater
Our critique of past gaydar research is most precisely focused on the claim that "people can accurately perceive who is gay." Based on all available evidence, this conclusion is mathematically incorrect. An alternate phrasing of this claim is that "people can accurately perceive orientation," which, arguably, seems more justified, given that 60% of the straight men are categorized correctly. But even this claim is misleading when one notes that if people assumed that everyone was straight, they would have 95% accuracy. Any alleged process for "perceiving orientation" is meaningless if it does not yield pragmatic accuracy for identifying members of the numerical minority from among the majority. Furthermore, we have shown Figure 1 . Laboratory evidence of gaydar accuracy provides evidence of real-world inaccuracy. Past gaydar research typically reports a 60% accuracy rate in lab studies using a false base rate in which 50% of the targets are gay men. This figure shows what 60% accuracy looks like when translated to a real-world situation in which only 5% of men are gay. Out of every 100 men, there will be 38 miscategorized straight men and three correctly categorized gay men. Based on all published evidence, using gaydar to identify someone as gay will be incorrect 93% of the time (38 / [38 + 3] = 92.7%).
experimentally that this claim perpetuates stereotyping to infer orientation (Cox et al., 2016) , a stereotyping process that has adverse consequences (Cox & Devine, 2014; Forscher et al., 2015) .
Although the conclusion that people can accurately perceive orientation is incorrect, the research that has been used to support that conclusion can still inform the literature in meaningful ways. As we noted previously (Cox et al., 2016, p. 168) , lab studies with artificial base rates can be useful for exploring intergroup similarities and differences between straight people and lesbian, gay, and bisexual (LGB) people. 3 For example, learning about what factors cause sexual orientation has been one of the biggest areas of study for sexuality researchers (DeLamater & Hyde, 1998) . Insomuch as these past studies document meaningful group similarities and differences that can build or test theories about the etiology of orientation, they are highly valuable to sexuality science (e.g., LeVay, 2011; Rieger et al., 2010) .
Even if they yield no pragmatic accuracy, understanding the cues people use to make snap judgments about orientation also has tremendous potential to inform our understanding of social perception, bias, and discrimination. If someone's facial structure, gait, or voice leads to a snap judgment or tacit inference about orientation, what consequences does that have? Will it affect hiring outcomes? Will it lead to social avoidance, anti-gay aggression, or other prejudice-related behaviors? Do these snap judgments lead to additional stereotypic inferences, for instance, about abilities, proclivities, and personality traits? Although we have shown that using stereotypes to infer sexual orientation leads to meaningful behavioral outcomes (Cox & Devine, 2014) , we are not aware of any research demonstrating that inferences based on the face, voice, or body movement lead to discriminatory or prejudicial outcomes. Inferences based on these traits will not be accurate in the real world, but it is clear from this prolific body of work that people do use them to make snap judgments about orientation. The behavioral processes that follow these snap judgments are open for future exploration. Even if people cannot always accurately judge a book by its cover, there is much we can learn from the fact that people often make those judgments anyway.
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